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cannot review mere error on certiorari. (Of. Redlands etc. 
Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 348, 360 [125 P.2d 
490].) 
The orders sought to be reviewed are affirmed. 
Shenk, J ., Edmonds, J ., Carter, J ., Traynor, J ., and Spence, 
J ., concurred. 
[Sac. No. 6601. In Bank. Dec. 29, 1955.] 
THE CAI,IB'OHNIA OHEGON POWER COMPANY, Peti-
tioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COUHT OF SISKIYOU 
COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in 
Interest. 
[1] Waters- Navigable Waters- Rights of State and Federal 
Government.-The field with respect to the maintenance of 
dams on navigable streams is not exclusively occupied for all 
purposes by the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.) 
or the Federal Power Commission; there is a duality of con-
trol between the federal and state governments, the extent of 
which is not specified. 
[2] !d.-Navigable Waters-Powers of State.-While state laws 
may not "veto" proJects on a navigable stream which are 
licensed by the Federal Power Commission and the giving of '1 
license may not be made contingent on the state's consent, that 
is, the state may not block the project completely, regulatory 
state laws which do not achieve that end are not improper. 
[3] !d.-Procedure and Practice-Jurisdiction.-Where the state. 
suing to abate a nuisance, has not asked that defendant power 
company cease operating its dams across a navigable stream 
but asks that they be so operated as not to create a danger 
to the public and the destruction of fish, the superior court. 
which has general jurisdiction over nuisances and the meas-
ures necessary to deal with them, has jurisdiction to try the 
action. 
[ 4] Administrative Law-Court Review-Exhaustion of Adminis-
trative Remedies.- Where the superior court has jurisdiction 
of a suit by the state to abate a nuisance arising out of 
[11 See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 524: Am.Jur., Waters, § 196. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, § 431; [2] Waters, § 432; 
l::!, 8J Waters, § 675; [4] Administrative Law, § 13: [5] Waters, 
~§ 673, 675; [6, 7] Public Utilities, § 12; [9] Nuisances, § 34. 
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defendant power maintenance and use of dams 
across a stream, the question of whether the state 
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before the Fed-
eral Power Commission is not pertinent. 
~5] Waters-Procedure and Practice-Remedies: Jurisdiction.-
In an action by the state to abate a nuisance arising out of 
defendant power maintenance and use of dams 
across a navigable stream, the state's intervention in subse-
quent proceedings before the Federal Power Commission is 
not of importance because the question is one of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter and the parties cannot grant or ex-
clude such jurisdiction. 
[6] Public Utilities-Exclusiveness of Commission's Jurisdiction-
Resort to Courts.-While the state Public Utilities Commission 
is given broad powers to regulate public utilities by the Con-
stitution and statutes, a superior court has jurisdiction to 
abate a nuisance created or maintained by a public utility, and 
neither the public utility law nor the Constitution excludes 
such jurisdiction. 
[7] !d.-Exclusiveness of Commission's Jurisdiction-Resort to 
Courts.-The grant of jurisdiction to the Public Utilities 
Commission is not exclusive, and until the commission has 
acted in reference to any public utility the superior court has 
jurisdiction in equity to enforce an obligation imposed by 
law on such utility. 
[8] Waters-Procedure and Practice-Jurisdiction.-An action by 
the state to abate a nuisance arising out of defendant power 
company's maintenance and operation of dams across a navi-
gable stream does not call on the court for a legislative 
declaration of policy on <;uch subject, but merely presents the 
question of what relief may be had for a condition which is 
dangerous to the lives of persons as shown by prior drownings 
and the destruction of fish. 
[9] Nuisances-Abatement-Action by Public Authorities.-The 
attorney general may bring an action to abate a nuisance on 
behalf of the state and the people. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of Siskiyou County from proceeding to try an action. 
Writ denied. 
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison and Gregory A. Harrison for 
Petitioner. 
[ 6) See Cal.Jur., Public Utilities and Services, § 19; Am.Ju., 
Public Utilities and Services, § 15. 
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Edmund G. 
Deputy Attorney General for -'-'""'~-''Juc•cu 
Interest. 
Henry Holsinger, Gavin M. Craig and 
Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Interest. 
C.2d 
W. Ferrier as 
and Real Party in 
CARTER, J.-This is a proceeding in which petitioner, a 
public utility and California corporation engaged in the 
production and sale of electricity in Oregon and California, 
hereafter referred to as defendant, seeks to have the re-
spondent Superior Court in Siskiyou County prohibited from 
trying an action pending therein in which the State of Cali-
fornia is plaintiff and the power company a defendant. 
In its complaint in the above-mentioned action filed in 
June, 1950, plaintiff alleged that Klamath River runs through 
Siskiyou, Humboldt and Del Norte Counties in California (its 
headwaters are in Oregon) and is navigable from its mouth 
to its confluence with Shasta River in Siskiyou County; that 
it is inhabited by fish, is regularly stocked by plaintiff, 
and the fish spawn in its waters; that the fish are the prop-
erty of plaintiff and held in trust for its people; that about 
1917 defendant built two dams, Copco 1 and 2, across the 
river at Copco, Siskiyou County, California, which together 
with hydroelectric generating plants, it uses to produce elec-
tricity; that in so maintaining and using those facilities 
defendant controls the natural flow of the river and causes 
it to fluctuate suddenly by reducing the flow when it is not 
generating power and increasing the flow when power is 
being generated; that as a result of such fluctuations large 
areas of the bed, banks and bars along the river for 75 miles 
downstream from Copco are and have been suddenly and 
abruptly uncovered or drained of water when defendant's 
hydroelectric plants are shut down, causing about 1,900,000 
fish to die; that >Yhen the plants are placed in operation 
after a temporary shutdown the result is a "wave front" 
causc•d by the sudden release of water which is a danger and 
menace to public safety and welfare, indeed, 14 persons have 
been drowned in an eight-year period as a result thereof; 
that such conduct of defendant constitutes a public nuisance 
and defendant has refused to take any action to alleviate it. 
In its complaint plaintiff prayed that the nuisance be abated 
and defendant enjoined from engaging in such injurious 
activities. 
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Defendant demurred to the asserting the court 
lacked It also made the same claim in its answer 
after the demurrer was overruled and by way of motion to 
dismiss, which motion also sought leave to amend its answer 
showing subsequent proceedings before the Federal Power 
Commission and to abate the action because of those proceed-
ings. The motion was denied. 
Defendant contends that the respondent has no jurisdiction 
because (1) the Federal Power Commission has exclusive 
jurisdiction under federal law over the location and regu-
lation of dams on navigable streams; (2) plaintiff has failed 
to exhaust its administrative remedy before that commission; 
(3) the California Public Utilities Commission has exclusive 
state jurisdiction over the issues presented; ( 4) plaintiff has 
an adequate remedy at law and hence is not entitled to 
injunctive relief; and ( 5) the subject matter is legislative, 
not judicial. 
Turning to the first contention, it appears that defendant 
never has obtained a license from the Federal Power Com-
mission for its Copco dams. After the action here involved 
was commenced and in April, 1951, it filed an application 
with that commission to launch Big Bend No. 2 Development 
which included additional dams one of which (Iron Gate) 
would allegedly ameliorate the fluctuation of the river. In 
November, 1951, the commission ordered defendant to show 
cause why it should not get licenses for the Copco dams, 
whether it was violating the Federal Power Act and other 
matters. Thereafter in ,T nne, 1952, plaintiff filed with the 
Federal Power Commission a petition to intervene in the 
proceedings before the commission and set forth the claims 
made by it in its complaint in the action here involved and 
asked for relief. Defendant answered plaintiff's petition to 
intervene setting forth the pleadings in the state court action. 
The commission granted plaintiff's petition. Hearings were 
had by the commission in 1952 and in 1954 it ordered de-
fendant to file applications for all its power installations on 
the Klamath River because it maintains dams ( Copco 1 and 
2) which fluctuate the flow and thus affect navigation and 
interstate commerce; it reserved jurisdiction to determine 
whether the construction of any regulating dam such as Iron 
Gate was necessary to avoid the fluctuation. 
The Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C.A. § 791 et seq.) creates 
the Federal Power Commission ( id., § 792). It is empowered 
to investigate water resources and the water power industry 
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and to issue licenses for the purpose ''of constructing, operat-
ing, and maintaining dams, water conduits, reservoirs, power 
houses, transmission lines, or other project works necessary 
or convenient for the development and improvement of navi-
gation and for the development, transmission, and utilization 
of power across, along, from, or in any of the streams or other 
bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction under 
its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and 
among the several States .... " (I d.,§ 797.) It is" ... un-
lawful for any person, State, or municipality, for the purpose 
of developing electric power, to construct, operate, or main-
tain any dam, water conduit, reservoir, power house, or other 
works incidental thereto across, along, or in any of the navi-
gable waters of the United States ... except under and in 
accordance with the terms of a permit or valid existing right-
of-way granted prior to June 10, 1920, or a license granted 
pursuant to this chapter." (ld., § 817.) It may on its own 
motion order an investigation of occupancy of, for the pur-
pose of developing electric power, streams over which Congress 
has jurisdiction and ''. . . to issue such order as it may find 
appropriate, expedient, and in the public interest to conserve 
and utilize the navigation and water-power resources of the 
region." (I d. § 797 (g).) Licenses may be issued for 50 
years and conditioned on all the provisions of the act and 
such further rules as the commission may prescribe ; and 
licenses may be revoked for the reasons specified in the act 
(Id., § 799). Applicants for licenses must submit evidence 
that they have complied with the laws of the state within 
which the project is located " ... with respect to bed and 
banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water 
for power purposes and with respect to the right to engage 
in the business of developing, transmitting, and distributing 
power, and in any other business necessary to effect the 
purposes of a license under this chapter." (ld., § 802(b).) 
Licenses shall be on the condition that the project will be 
such as in the judgment of the commission it is best adapted 
''. . . to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing 
a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate 
or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization 
of water-power development, and for other beneficial public 
uses, including recreational purposes. . . . (I d., § 803 (a).) 
The licensee shall conform to the commission's rules and 
regulations "for the protection of life, health, and property" 
and shall be liable for damages occasioned to the property 
and others by the maintenance and operation of the project. 
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§ 803 The United States Attorney General may 
on request of the commission ''. . . institute proceedings in 
equity in the district court of the United States in the district 
in which any project or part thereof is situated for the pur-
pose of revoking for violation of its terms any permit or license 
issued hereunder, or for the purpose of remedying or cor-
recting injunction, mandamus, or other process any act 
of commission or omission in violation of the provisions of 
this title or of any lawful regulation or order promulgated 
hereunder. The district courts shall have jurisdiction over 
all of the above-mentioned proceedings and shall have power 
to issue and execute all necessary proet>ss and to make and 
enforce all writs, orders, and decrees to compel compliance 
with the lawful orders and regulations of the commission ... 
and to compel the performance of any condition imposed 
under the provisions of this title." (I d., § 820.) And finally, 
"Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as 
affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with 
the laws of the respective States relating to the control, 
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation 
or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired 
therein." (I d., § 821.) 
The question thus presented is whether the federal govern-
ment has occupied the field with respect to the maintenance 
of dams on navigable streams to the exclusion of state juris-
diction; there is no question of federal supremacy in the 
reg-ulation of navigable streams. 
In Henry Ford & Son v. Little Falls Fibre Co., 280 U.S. 
369 [50 S.Ct. 140, 74 I-1.Ed. 483], the New York state court, 
in an action for upstream riparian owners, had awarded 
damages and injunctive relief against petitioner, a power 
company, which had a license from the federal commission 
to take water from a federal dam and maintain on the top 
of the dam flash-boards to facilitate its diversion. The flash-
board raised the water level above the dam to the riparian 
owners' damage. The state law made petitioner's conduct 
an actionable wrong but it relied on its federal license. The 
court held that even though the commission acted within 
its jurisdiction in authorizing the project and in the advance-
ment of navigation under the Federal Power Act, supra, such 
act " ... does not purport to authorize a licensee of the Com-
mission to impair such rights recognized by state law without 
compensation. Even though not immune from such destruc-
tion they are. nevertheless, an appropriate subject for legis-
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lative Ford & Son v. Little Falls Fibre 
Co., 280 U.S. 369, 377 [50 S.Ct. 140, 74 L.Ed. 483] .) Refer-
ence is made to sections 803 and 821, supra, the court stat-
ing: ''While these sections are consistent with the recognition 
that state laws the distribution or use of water in 
navigable waters and the derived from those laws may 
be subordinate to the power of the national to 
regulate commerce upon nevertheless so restrict 
the operation of the entire act that the powers conferred by 
it on the Commission do not extend to the impairment of 
the operation of those laws or to the extinguishment of rights 
acquired under them without remuneration." (Henry Ford 
& Son v. Little E1alls Fibre Co., snpra, 378.) This was re-
affirmed in Federal Power Com. v. JJlohawlc Powet· 
Corp., 347 U.S. 239 [74 S.Ct. 487, 98 L.Ed. 666], where later 
cases to the same effect were cited. ·while the court speaks 
of private proprietary rights it stresses the sovereignty of 
the state. 
In First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Com., 
328 U.S. 152 [66 S.Ct. 906, 90 L.Ed. 1143], the petitioner 
power company applied to the commission for a license to 
erect a dam on a navigable stream in Iowa. It did not show 
in its application (as required by the Federal Power Act, 
§ 802 (b), supra) that it had complied with Iowa's legislation 
that a permit from a state agency must be obtained before 
any dam could be erected and such erections could only be 
under certain conditions. The court held that a showing 
of such compliance was not a condition precedent to securing 
a license from the federal commission. The court stated the 
question was the need, if any, for petitioner to present evi-
dence to the commission that he had complied with Iowa 
law (Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.A., § 802(b), supra). The 
court said ( p. 164) : "To require the petitioner to secure 
the actual grant to it of a state permit under . . . as a con-
dition precedent to securing a federal license for the same 
project under the Pederal Power Act would vest in the 
Executive Council of Iowa a veto power over the federal 
project. Such a veto power easily could destroy the effective-
ness of the Federal Act. It would subordinate to the control 
of the State the 'comprehensive' planning which the Act 
provides shall depend upon the judgment of the Federal 
Power Commission or other representatives of the Federal 
Government. 
" [T] he State Code requires that 'the method of construc-
tion, operation, maintenance, and equipment of any and all 
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dams in such waters shall be to the approval of the 
Executive Council.' This would subject to state control the 
very requirements of the project that Congress has placed in 
the discretion of the Federal Power Commission. A still 
greater difficulty is illustrated by § 7771. This states the 
requirements for a state permit as follows: 
'' '7771 When permit granted. If it shall appear to the 
council that the construction, operation, or maintenance of 
the dam will not materially obstruct existing navigation, or 
materially affect other public rights, will not endanger life 
or public health, and any water taken from the stream in 
eonnechon with the project is returned thereto at the nearest 
practicable place without being materially diminished in quan-
tity or polluted or rendered deletrious to fish life, it shall 
grant the permit, upon such terms and conditions as it may 
prescribe.' (Italics supplied.) 
"This strikes at the heart of the present project .... 
''. . . Compliance with state requirements that are in con-
flict with federal requirements may well block the federal 
license. For example, compliance with the state requirement, 
discussed above, that the water of the Cedar River shall be 
returned to it at the nearest practicable place would reduce 
the project to the small one which is classified by the Federal 
Power Commission as 'neither desirable nor adequate.' Sim-
ilarly, compliance with the engineering requirements of the 
State Executive Council, if additional to or different from 
the federal requirements, may well result in duplications of 
expenditures that would handicap the financial success of 
the project. Compliance with requirements for a permit that 
is not to be issued is a procedure so futile that it cannot be 
imputed to Congress in the absence of an express provision 
for it. On the other hand, there is ample opportunity for 
the Federal Power Commission, under the authority expressly 
given to it by Congress, to require by regulation the presen-
tation of evidence satisfactory to it of the petitioner's com-
pliance with any of the requirements for a state permit on 
the state waters of Iowa that the Commission considers appro-
priate to effect the purposes of a federal license on the navi-
gable waters of the United States." With reference to the 
power of the state and the United States the court said: 
''In the Federal Power Act there is a separation of those 
subjects which remain under the jurisdiction of the States 
from those subjects which the Constitution delegates to the 
United States and over which Congress vests the Federal 
45 C.2d-28 
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Power Commission with to act. To the extent of 
this separation, the Act establishes a dual system of control. 
The duality of control consists merely of the division of the 
common enterprise between two cooperating agencies of gov-
ernment, each with final authority in its own jurisdiction. 
The duality does not two agencies to share in the final 
decision of the same issue. Where the Federal Government 
supersedes the state government there is no suggestion that 
the two agencies both shall have final authority. In fact a 
contrary policy is indicated in § § 4 (e), 10 (a), (b) and (c). 
and 23 (b). In those sections the Act places the responsibility 
squarely upon federal officials and usually upon the Federal 
Power Commission. A dual final authority, with a duplicate 
system of state permits and federal licenses required for each 
project, would be unworkable. 'Compliance with the require-
ments' of such a duplicated system of licensing would be 
nearly as bad. Conformity to both standards would be im-
possible in some cases and probably difficult in most of 
them .... 
''The securing of an Iowa state permit is not in any sense 
a condition precedent or an administrative procedure that 
must be exhausted before securing a federal license. It is 
a procedure required by the State of Iowa in dealing with 
its local streams and also with the waters of the United States 
within that State in the absence of an assumption of juris-
diction by the United States over the navigability of its waters. 
Now that the Federal Government has taken jurisdiction of 
such waters under the Federal Power Act, it has not by statute 
or regulation added the state requirements to its federal 
requirements. . . . 
"[This] brings us to consideration of the effect of the 
Federal Power Act upon it and the related state statutes. 
We find that when that Act is read in the light of its long 
and colorful legislative history, it discloses both a vigorous 
determination of Congress to make progress with the devel-
opment of the long idle water power resources of the Nation 
and a determination to avoid unconstitutional invasion of the 
jurisdiction of the States. The solution reached is to apply 
the principle of the division of constitutional powers between 
the State and Federal Governments. This has resulted in a 
dual system involving the close integration of these powers 
rather than a dual system of futile duplication of two author-
ities over the same subject matter. 
"The Act leaves to the States their traditional jurisdiction 
subject to the admittedly superior of the Federal Gov-
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ernment, interstate and foreign 
eommerce, administer the public lands and reservations of 
the United States and, in certain cases, exercise authority 
under the treaties of the United States. These sources of 
eonstitutional authority are all applied in the Federal Power 
Act to the development of the navigable waters of the United 
States." (First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power 
Corn., supra, 328 U.S. 152, 167.) And in regard to the effect 
of the reservation of state jurisdiction {§ 821, supra) the 
court said: "The effect of § 27 [16 U.S.C.A., § 821], in 
protecting state laws from supersedure, is limited to laws 
as to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of water 
in irrigation or for municipal or other uses of the same nature. 
It therefore has primary, if not exclusive, reference to such 
proprietary rights. The phrase 'any vested right acquired 
therein' further emphasizes the application of the section to 
property rights. There is nothing in the paragraph to sug-
gest a broader scope unless it be the words 'other uses.' Those 
words, however, are confined to rights of the same nature as 
those relating to the use of water in irrigation or for municipal 
purposes. This was so held in an early decision by a District 
Court, relating to § 27 and upholding the constitutionality 
of the Act, where it was stated that 'a proper construction 
of the act requires that the words "other uses" shall be 
construed ejusdem generis with the words ''irrigation'' and 
"municipal."' Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 
F. 606, 619. 
"This section therefore is thoroughly consistent with the 
integration rather than the duplication of federal and state 
jurisdictions under the Federal Power Act. It strengthens 
the argument that, in those fields where rights are not thus 
'saved' to the States, Congress is willing to let the super-
sedure of the state laws by federal legislation take its natural 
course." (First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power 
Com., supra, 328 U.S. 152, 175.) The First Iowa case waE< 
followed by Federal Power Corn. v. State of Oregon, 349 U.S 
435 [75 S.Ct. 832, 99 L.Ed. 1215], where the federal com. 
mission had granted a license to a power company to erect 
and maintain a power dam on a nonnavigable stream on 
property owned by the United States, with provisions for 
anadromous fish. Oregon sought a review of the order for 
a license, asserting that the lieensee must have a permit from 
it and adequate provision was not made for the fish. It was 
held that authorization of the project was within the exclusive 
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jurisdiction of the federal commission and the state's consent 
was not necessary. In to the claim that the commission 
had not made adequate provision for the fish or the fluctuation 
of the natural flow of the river, the court said: ''In this 
reregulation of the flow of the stream, the Commission acts 
on behalf of the people of Oregon, as well as others, in 
to it that the interests of all concerned are adequately pro-
tected. 
''There remains the effect of the project upon anadromous 
fish which use these waters as grounds. All agree 
that the 205-foot dam will cut off access of some fish to their 
natural spawning grounds above dam and that such inter-
ruption cannot be overcome by fish ladders. However, the 
State does not flatly prohibit the construction of dams that 
cut off anadromous fish from their spawning or breeding 
grounds. One alternative, thus recognized, is the supplying 
of new breeding pools to which the fish can be removed at 
appropriate times. The Fish Commission of Oregon has denied 
a permit to tl1e Portland General Electric Company to carry 
out its present proposal but there appears to be no disagree-
ment as to the underlying principle involved." (Federal 
Power Com. v. State of Oregon, rmpra, 832,840 [75 S.Ct.].) In 
State of Wash. Dept. of Game v. Federal Power Com., 207 F. 
2d 391, certiorari denied. 347 U.S. 936 [74 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed. 
1087], it was again held that state laws could not entirely 
block a project on a navigable stream for which a city in 
·washington was seeking from the commission a license to 
construct. 
[1] Implicit in the foregoing opinions is the concept 
that the field is not exclusively occupied for all purposes 
by the Federal Po\\·er Act or the federal commission. There 
is a duality of control the extent of which is not specified. 
[2] \Vhile it is clear the state laws may not "veto" projects 
licensed by the federal commission nor may the giving of a 
license be made contingent on the state's consent, that is, 
the state may not block the project completely, there is nothing 
therein indicating that regulatory state laws which do not 
achieve that end are not proper. There is nothing said about 
nuisances or danger to the public in the Federal Power Act, 
and the giving of any remedial relief seems to rest not with 
the commission but by court action by the United States 
Attorney General on request of the commission. Here we 
are concerned with the abatement of a nuisancr, in a sense 
a local police measure. The federal commission has not pur-
ported to adjudicate that question or do anything about it 
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except to defendant apply for a license for its dams, 
Copco 1 and 2, which for many years it has maintained 
without any efl'ort to obtain a license and the commission 
has done in regard to the problem. It must be 
remembered that the present prohibition proceeding goes only 
to the of the jurisdiction of the Siskiyou County 
'l'he state has not even asked in the action 
that defendant cease operating its dams; it asks that they 
be so operated as to not create the danger to the public and 
the destruction of the fish. Being a jurisdictional question 
we do not speculate on what the judgment of the Siskiyou 
court may be. It may find means to alleviate the alleged 
nuisance without substantially interfering with the power 
output of the dams. If it has jurisdiction to make any kind 
of a judgment in the premises-to afford any relief-then 
it has jurisdiction to try the action. It certainly has gen-
eral jurisdiction over nuisances and the measures necessary 
to deal with them. In the First Iowa case, supra, the court 
likened the federal commission to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power 
Com., 345 U.S. 153 [73 S.Ct. 609, 97 L.Ed. 918] ), hence 
Yolo Water etc. Co. v. Sttperior Court, 43 Cal..App. 332 [185 
P. 195), is pertinent in its statement that the superior court 
could abate a public nuisance by a public utility although 
such utilities are subject to regulation by the state Public 
Utilities Commission under our Constitution (Cal. Const., 
art. XII, §§ 22, 23 and 23a) and statr (Pub. Util. Code). 
The court said (p. 341): "Powers conferred by the consti-
tution upon the Railroad Commission to supervise and reg-
ulate public utilities and to bring suits to enforce its orders 
and compel public utilities to obey the law is not inconsistent 
with the power conferred npon superior courts to entertain 
injunction suits instituted by others than the commission 
against public utilities. To so hold will not create any conflict 
between the courts and the commission, because in all such 
suits the courts will be bound and guided and controlled in 
all respects in entertaining and deciding or dismissing them 
as much by section 23 of the constitution and the Public 
Utility Act as by any other provision of the law." 
[4] Since the Siskiyou County court has jurisdiction in 
the premises the question of the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is not pertinent. [5] The intervention by plaintiff 
in the federal commission proceeding is not of importance 
because the question is one of jurisdiction over the subject 
870 C.2d 
matter and the or exclude such juris-
diction. Further in cannot be said that 
an adequate remedy at law exists; that proceedings before 
the federal commission, assuming that such is a jurisdictional 
question. 
[6] There is no merit to defendant's contention that the 
state Public Utilities Commission has over the 
subject matter to the exclusion of the The 
state commission is given broad powers to regulate public 
utilities by our Constitution and statutes, supra (People v. 
Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal.2d 621 P.2d 723] ), but 
the only case which is directly in point on the issues here 
present is Yolo Water etc. Co. v. Superior Court, sttpra, where 
the court held that a superior court has jurisdiction to abate 
a nuisance created or maintained by a public utility and 
neither the public utility law nor the Constitution excludes 
such jurisdiction. That case has been cited with approval. 
(Truck Owners etc., Inc. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 146 
[228 P. 19] ; Coast Truck Line v. Ashbury Truck Co., 218 
Cal. 337 [23 P.2d 513].) While the discussion in the Yolo 
case may be dictum in part, it is persuasive on the point here 
involved. 
In this same connection defendant claims the instant action 
would take water rights it was said to have (fluctuation of 
the stream, Moore v. California Oregon Power Co., 22 Cal.2d 
725 [140 P.2d 798], with respect to lower riparian owners) 
and that a court cannot alter a utility's water rights without 
the approval of the state commission, citing Crttm v. Mt. 
Shasta Power Corp., 220 Cal. 295 [30 P.2d 30], but those 
questions go to the scope of the relief which the court may 
give in the action, questions which are not jurisdictional. 
[7] Moreover, the grant of jurisdiction to the commission 
''is not exclusive, and until the . . . commission has acted 
in reference to any public utility the superior court has juris-
diction in equity to enforce an obligation imposed by law 
upon such utility." (Miller v. Railroad Corn., 9 Cal.2d 190, 
195 [70 P.2d 164, 112 A.L.R. 221].) 
[8] Defendant urges that respondent court is without 
jurisdiction in that the issues presented in the action are 
legislative rather than judicial because the object of the action 
is to legislate for the future with respect to the regulation 
of hydroelectric installations on navigable streams and to 
declare the state's policy in regard to the adjustment of the 
competing interests, that is, the preservation of fish and 
maintenance and operation of such dams. Reference is made 
Dec. 1955] CALIF. OREGON PowER Co. v. SuPERIOR CouRT 871 
f 45 C.2d 858; 291 P.Zd 455] 
to studies a state the state Fish and 
Game Commission and the Public Utilities Commission a1 
the request of the Legislature, dealing with the fluctuation 
of the flow of the Klamath River. Reliance is placed on 
Werner v. Southern Calif. etc. Newspapers, 35 
P.2d 825, 13 A.L.R.2d 252], Lockard v. City 
Los 33 Cal.2d 453 P.2d 7 A.L.R2d 990], 
and Wilson v. Walters, 19 Cal.2d 111 [119 P.2d 340]. Those 
cases say that questions of policy are primarily for 
the Legislature and it should choose between conflicting pol-
ICies. The action does not purport to call upon the court 
for a drclaration of policy on the above-mentioned 
subject. It merely presents the question of what relief if 
any may be had for the condition which is dangerous to the 
lives of persons as shovvn by prior drownings and the destruc-
tion of fish. "\Vith respect to the condition, activity or conduct 
which may comtitute a public nuisance, the Legislature has 
declared that "Anything which is injurious to health, or is 
indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the 
free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable 
enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the 
free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable 
lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, 
square, street, or highway is a nuisance." ( Civ. Code, 
~ 3479.) "A public nuisance is one which affects at the same 
time an entire community or neighborhood, or any consider-
able number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance 
or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal." ( Civ. 
Code, § 3480.) '' 'l'he remedies against a public nuisance are : 
1. Indictment or information; 2. A civil action; or, 3. Abate-
ment." (Civ. Code, § 3491.) [9] The attorney general may 
bring an action to abate a nuisance on behalf of the state 
and the people. (People v. Truckee Lbr. Co., 116 Cal. 397 
[48 P. 374, 58 Am.St.Rep. 183, 39 L.R.A. 581]; People ex 
rel. Roberts v. Beaudry, 91 Cal. 213 [27 P. 610] ; People v. 
Glenn-Colusa lrr. Dist., 127 Cal.App. 30 [15 P.2d 549] .) 
The alternative writ is discharged and the petition for a 
peremptory writ is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
J., and McComb, J. pro tern.,* concurred. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied January 
25, 1956. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
